Vulnerability Assessment of Interdependent Power and Communications Networks under Varying Level of Interdependency by Banothu, Rahul
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF INTERDEPENDENT POWER AND 
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS UNDER VARYING LEVEL OF INTERDEPENDENCY 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the 
North Dakota State University 
of Agriculture and Applied Science 
By 
Rahul Banothu 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major Department:  
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering 
 
November 2017 
Fargo, North Dakota 
  
North Dakota State University 
Graduate School 
 
Title 
 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF INTERDEPENDENT POWER 
AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS UNDER VARYING LEVEL 
OF INTERDEPENDENCY 
  
  
  By   
  
Rahul Banothu 
  
     
    
  The Supervisory Committee certifies that this disquisition complies with North Dakota 
State University’s regulations and meets the accepted standards for the degree of 
 
  MASTER OF SCIENCE  
    
    
  SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:  
    
  
Dr. Chrysafis Vogiatzis 
 
  Chair  
  
Dr. Om Prakash Yadav 
 
  
Dr. Simone Ludwig 
 
  
 
 
    
    
  Approved:  
   
 11/17/2017   Dr. Om Prakash Yadav   
 Date  Department Chair  
    
 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
Maintaining a continuous and robust supply of power could be challenging task, because 
power networks depend on proper communication to coordinate and schedule supply, as well as 
recognize and mitigate failures; communication networks depend on power to function. This 
interdependency is a cause for greater failure risks due to the rapid cascading of failures from 
one network to the other.  
The objective of this work is to investigate the vulnerability of interdependent networks 
under various scenarios and coupling assumptions. To do so, we employ heuristic techniques to 
detect critical nodes in either network which lead to the maximum number of failed nodes in the 
interdependent networks. We put to the test a series of topographical importance metrics to 
heuristically identify said important nodes and compare our results with the literature. 
Furthermore, we test different coupling methods for how interdependency works and compare 
the results under different failure assumptions. 
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Chrysafis Vogiatzis for his 
constant guidance and encouragement throughout my thesis. 
 I would like to thank my parents and my brother for always having faith in me and 
providing unconditional love and support throughout my education. This thesis would not be 
possible without their emotional and financial support.  
I would also like to thank my friends who have encouraged and helped me during tough 
times while working on my thesis. 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... x 
LIST OF SYMBOLS ..................................................................................................................... xi 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE ........................................................................... 4 
2.1. Introduction to the power grid and network models ............................................................ 4 
2.2. Individual network models & scale free network ................................................................ 5 
2.3. Interdependence and cascading ............................................................................................ 8 
2.3.1. Interdependence of power and communication networks ........................................... 11 
2.4. Critical node problem ......................................................................................................... 12 
2.5. Interdependent network coupling models .......................................................................... 14 
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................ 15 
3.1. Power and communication network model ........................................................................ 15 
3.2. Cascading failures model ................................................................................................... 15 
3.3. Iterative interdependent centrality ...................................................................................... 16 
3.4. Star degree and modified IIC ............................................................................................. 17 
3.5. Coupling models ................................................................................................................ 19 
3.5.1. One to one model......................................................................................................... 19 
3.5.2. One to multiple model ................................................................................................. 19 
3.5.3. Multiple to one model ................................................................................................. 20 
3.5.4. Multiple to multiple model .......................................................................................... 20 
 vi 
CHAPTER 4. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS........................................................................... 21 
4.1. One to one coupling model ................................................................................................ 21 
4.2. Other models ...................................................................................................................... 25 
4.2.1. Scenarios...................................................................................................................... 25 
4.2.2. One to multiple coupling model .................................................................................. 25 
4.2.3. Multiple to one coupling model .................................................................................. 36 
4.2.4. Multiple to multiple coupling model ........................................................................... 46 
4.3. Analysis .............................................................................................................................. 56 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS................................................................................. 58 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 59 
 
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Properties and data from several real-world networks. .............................................................. 7 
 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. An example of percolation and cascading failures in interdependent networks. ...................... 11 
2. One to One model, Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node 
networks across 5 runs ............................................................................................................. 22 
3. One to One model, Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node 
networks across 5 runs ............................................................................................................. 23 
4. One to One model, Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node 
networks across 5 runs ............................................................................................................. 24 
5. One to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 150-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................................... 27 
6. One to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 300-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................................... 28 
7. One to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 500-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................................... 29 
8. One to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 150-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................................... 30 
9. One to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 300-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................................... 31 
10. One to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 500-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 32 
11. One to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 150-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 33 
12. One to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 300-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 34 
13. One to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 500-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 35 
14. Multiple to One model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 150-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 37 
15. Multiple to One model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 300-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 38 
 ix 
16. Multiple to One model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 500-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 39 
17. Multiple to One model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 150-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 40 
18. Multiple to One model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 300-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 41 
19. Multiple to One model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 500-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 42 
20. Multiple to One model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 150-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 43 
21. Multiple to One model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 300-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 44 
22. Multiple to One model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed 
for 500-node networks across 5 runs ...................................................................................... 45 
23. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes 
removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................... 47 
24. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes 
removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................... 48 
25. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes 
removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................... 49 
26. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes 
removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................... 50 
27. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes 
removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................... 51 
28. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes 
removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................... 52 
29. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes 
removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................... 53 
30. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes 
removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................... 54 
31. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes 
removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs ....................................................................... 55 
 
 x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BA ...................................................................... Barabási–Albert 
CNP .................................................................... Critical Node Problem 
CCNP ................................................................. Cardinality Constrained Critical Node Problem 
ER ....................................................................... Erdős–Rényi 
GCC ................................................................... Giant Connected Component 
IIC ...................................................................... Iterative Interdependent Centrality 
LCC .................................................................... Largest Connected Component 
 
 xi 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
𝛾 ............................................................................ Scaling exponent or exponential factor 
𝐺 ............................................................................ Graph or network 
𝑉 ............................................................................ Vertex 
𝐸 ............................................................................ Edge 
∀ ............................................................................ For all 
∈ ............................................................................ Belongs to 
∃ ............................................................................ There exists 
𝑂 ............................................................................ Limiting behavior of a function when 
argument tends towards a particular value or 
infinity 
Σ............................................................................. Summation 
 
  
 
  
 1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Societal welfare and well-being are intertwined with access to a fully functioning power 
system. This dependence of our lives on electricity has increased the necessity for power 
networks that are flexible and robust, and hence can be there for continuous support of human 
activity without any outage. To ensure the continuous and uninterrupted flow of power, modern 
power stations and substations depend on sophisticated communication systems for their control 
and coordination; similarly, communication systems depend on the power network for their 
support. This necessary interdependency renders both networks more vulnerable, as a failure in 
one of the networks could cascade to the other with catastrophic consequences. An example of 
such a failure comes from 2003, where cascading failures in the Northeast American power 
network affected 45 million people in 8 US states, and 10 million people in Canada. Moreover, 
power was not fully restored until one week after the event. From investigations, it was found 
that the sequence of events leading to the blackout was a different, seemingly unrelated failure in 
northern Ohio. The above situation was not an exception, as shown from more power blackouts 
observed in Italy in 2003, in Japan in 2011, and in India in 2012 (Feltes & Grande-Moran, 2014;  
Liu et al., 2014; Corsi & Sabelli, 2004; Mimura, Yasuhara, Kawagoe, Yokoki, & Kazama, 2011; 
Loi Lei Lai, Hao Tian Zhang, Chun Sing Lai, Fang Yuan Xu, & Mishra, 2013; 
Ramasubramanian et al., 2012). This phenomenon is attributed to an aging infrastructure, along 
with the deregularization of the power industry worldwide.  
Such interdependency between modern infrastructures is not limited to power networks 
though. Instead, such coupled systems include water distribution, telecommunications, 
transportation, and social networks. These large socio-technical systems and the problem of 
random and targeted failures has attracted significant scientific interest recently. 
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To keep the flow continuous and uninterrupted, power stations depend on the 
communication network for control and management; the communication network also depends 
on a fully functional power network for electrical support and continuous operation. The 
interdependency of these networks renders the power network more vulnerable, as the overall 
scale of failure could be significantly increased due to cascading effect induced by 
communication network (Parandehgheibi & Modiano, 2013; Bashan, Berezin, Buldyrev, & 
Havlin, 2013). Should a perpetrator be interested in breaking down the power network, it would 
take only a targeted select set of nodes to significantly disrupt operations (Yilin Shen, Nguyen, 
Ying Xuan, & Thai, 2013). Seeing as a failure of certain nodes in the communication network 
can cascade and cause failure in the power network, and vice versa, protection from such attacks 
(or random failures) is a hard task. It is, hence, important to detect these nodes, as well as study 
the interdependency of these networks, in advance so that they can maintain the interdependency 
and at the same time mitigate the risk from targeted attacks. 
Studying the importance of an entity in a network of operations is a topic that has 
attracted significant interest from a wide variety of scientific and practice fields. A brief 
literature review on this topic with an emphasis on power networks is provided in Chapter 2. In 
the general literature, some studies capture the importance of a node in a multi-layered network 
while treating each network as independent (Estrada, Estrada, Prof, & Knight, 2015;Freeman, 
1978;Freeman, 1977): as an example, the degree of a node, which states the number of nodes 
directly connected to it, the number of shortest paths passing through a node, or the sum of 
length of shortest paths between nodes. As these approaches do not consider any underlying 
interdependencies, they are typically outperformed on interdependent networks by more 
specialized metrics and are inaccurate estimates of importance.  
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While assessing the vulnerability of interdependent networks, it became necessary to also 
investigate different interdependency models between the two networks, and how these could 
affect the existing approaches of finding interdependent network centrality. An interesting 
approach in literature called Iterative Interdependent Centrality (Nguyen, Shen, & Thai, 2013) 
aims to calculate the local intra-centrality (the centrality of a node within its network) of nodes 
using traditional centrality metrics (e.g., degree) and then iteratively update that value based on 
its interdependencies. The initial objective of this work then was to see how the IIC of a node 
varies when changing the means of calculating intra-centrality and how this would affect the 
efficiency and accuracy of finding such critical nodes. Then, a hybrid approach to measure 
interdependent network centrality is introduced, which includes combining a novel centrality 
metric with a modified version of IIC. Last, considering the fact that real world power networks 
usually receive information from several nodes in the communication network (Amin, 2001), it 
became necessary to also study different coupling models to assess the vulnerability of the power 
network under different scenarios. Our results from the mentioned models and approaches 
should provide more information regarding vulnerabilities of interdependent power networks and 
help making better informed decisions to protect power networks and render them less 
susceptible to targeted attacks and random failures. 
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
The following section introduces some related literature on interdependent networks, the 
specific problem we are trying to address on coupled networks, and the models and algorithms 
used to study, analyze, and solve it. 
2.1. Introduction to the power grid and network models 
The United States power grid has faced 4 major large-scale blackouts due to cascading 
failures, starting from the first one in 1965 (Vassell, 1991) and reaching out to the latest on in 
2003 which affected more than 45 million people (Farmer & Allen, 2006). Since 2003, scientific 
and practitioner interest in investigating the root causes of such network failures has peaked. 
That said, graph theoretic analyses of the underlying network were popular even in the early 
1970s and 1980s. Networks were mined for their topological properties, and several metrics were 
proposed to explain and predict network behaviors. However, the inherent computational 
intractability of many of those metrics made progress slow due, in part, to the lack of the 
necessary computational resources, especially for studying real-life, large-scale networks, such 
as the power distribution network. Much has changed in the last decade, leading to the 
development of several complex models for network analysis, which albeit harder to solve, 
require less time to execute (Nardelli et al., 2014). These models have been helpful to better 
assess important real-world networks, like the power grid. Topological models have also been 
used to study other real-world networks, e.g., transportation networks (Yingfei, Chao, & 
Xiaohong, 2010), climate networks (Yamasaki, Gozolchiani, & Havlin, 2008), neural networks 
(Torres, Muñoz, Marro, & Garrido, 2004), among others. 
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2.2. Individual network models & scale free network 
The introduction of the Erdős–Rényi (ER) random graph model (P Erdös & Rényi, 1959) 
gave rise to the development of multiple network models, including the Barabási–Albert (BA) 
random scale-free model (A. Barabási, 2013), and the Watts–Strogatz (WS) model (Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998), which can be utilized to explain most of the smaller and larger scale real-life 
complex networks. The ER model states that the probability of a vertex having an edge is 
independent of the other vertices present in the graph (P Erdös & Rényi, 1959; Gilbert, 1959). 
Using BA models, it was shown that most real world networks possess similar characteristics, 
like nodal degree or clustering coefficient distributions (Amaral, Scala, Barthelemy, & Stanley, 
2000; A. L. Barabási, Albert, & Jeong, 1999), which classifies them as “scale-free networks”. 
The BA model also reveals that networks consist of a small number of nodes, referred to as 
“hubs”, which have a significantly higher degree than the rest of the nodes. Such networks are 
shown to have a degree distribution which follows the power law. This implies that the 
probability of a fraction of nodes 𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑘) having 𝑘 connections (a degree of 𝑘) is proportional to 
1
𝑘𝛾
, where 𝛾 is the scaling exponent (Barabasi, 2009). This scaling exponent is typically between 
2 and 3 for most large-scale, real-world networks. The introduction of such models also provided 
us with insight on the universality of network topology in many real networks and the realization 
that such networks, independent of size or function, tend to converge to similar architectures. 
Examples of a well-known studied networks possessing the scale-free property include 
biological networks (see, e.g., Han et al., 2004), the world wide web (see, e.g., A.-L. Barabási & 
Albert, 1999a), collaborations in Hollywood (A.-L. Barabási & Albert, 1999b), research 
collaborations in neuroscience and mathematics (A. L. Barabási et al., 2002), the E. coli 
metabolism network (Oltvai, Barabási, Jeong, Tombor, & Albert, 2000), the S. cerevisiae protein 
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interactions (Jeong, Mason, Barabási, & Oltvai, 2001), citation networks (Redner, 1998), phone 
call networks (Aiello, Chung, & Lu, 2001), as well as the co-occurrence of words (Cancho & 
Solé, 2001) and synonyms (Yook, Jeong, Barabási, & Tu, 2001). 
An important parameter for the structural properties of a scale-free network is the power 
law exponent, with research revealing that the lower the exponent, the higher the number of hubs 
in the network (Reka Albert & Barabasi, 2002; Newman, 2003). Another important graph 
theoretic perspective comes from percolation theory (Stauffer & Aharony, 1994), which has 
been employed to evaluate network robustness. This is done through proper analysis of the 
structural properties of the giant connected component, which is qualitatively defined as the 
connected component of the network containing the majority of its nodes. Usually, the term 𝑃∞ is 
reserved to represent the probability of the existence of a giant connected component of a 
network. 𝑃∞~1, then, represents the existence of a giant connected component almost surely, 
while 𝑃∞~0 reveals the absence of a giant connected component. Now, randomly selecting and 
failing (removing them and its connections) a fraction of nodes equal to 1 − 𝑝 gives us the 
largest connected component of the remaining network represented by 𝑃∞(p). There exists a 
critical threshold, or percolation threshold, 𝑝𝑐 ∈ [0,1] which determines the critical point where 
the network goes through a second order phase transition, also called a percolation phase 
transition. When 𝑝 > 𝑝𝑐, the network converges into one giant connected component and goes 
into a super critical state. However, when 𝑝 < 𝑝𝑐, the probability 𝑃∞(𝑝) is always 0 (i.e., 𝑝 < 𝑝𝑐,
𝑃∞(𝑝) ≡ 0) (Bollobás & Riordan, 2006; Gilbert, 1961; Wierman, 1990). Almost all scale-free 
networks with long tailed degree distributions have a threshold of 𝑃𝑐 ≡ 0, which, in turn, 
explains the robustness of these networks to random failures (Cohen, Erez, Ben-Avraham, & 
Havlin, 2000). The ER model has a percolation threshold of 𝑝𝑐 =
1
𝑘
 where 𝑘 is the average nodal 
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degree in the network (Bollobas & Erdös, 1976; P Erdös & Rényi, 1959; Paul Erdös & Rényi, 
1960). Some examples of real-world networks, with their power law exponents and average path 
lengths can be found in Table 1.  
Table 1  
Properties and data from several real-world networks.  
Network Size k γout γin lreal lpow Reference 
Internet 325729 4.51 2.45 2.1 11.2 4.77 
Réka Albert, 
Jeong, & 
Barabási, 1999 
Internet 4 ∗ 107 7 2.38 2.1   
Kleinberg, 
Kumar, 
Raghavan, 
Rajagopalan, & 
Tomkins, 1999 
Internet 2*108 7.5 2.72 2.1 16 7.61 
Broder et al., 
2000 
Internet-
Domains 
3015~4389 3.42~3.76 2.1~2.2 2.1~2.2 4 5.2 
Faloutsos, 
Faloutsos, & 
Faloutsos, 1999 
Internet-
routers 
3888 2.57 2.48 2.48 12.15 7.67 
Faloutsos et al., 
1999 
Internet- 
routers 
150000 2.66 2.4 2.4 11  
Govindan & 
Tangmunarunkit, 
2000 
Movie 
actors co-
stardom 
network 
212250 28.78 2.3 2.3 4.54  
A.-L. Barabási 
& Albert, 1999b 
Co-authors 
in 
neuroscience 
209293 11.54 2.1 2.1 6  
A. L. Barabási et 
al., 2002 
Co-authors 
in 
mathematics 
70975 3.9 2.5 2.5 9.5  
A. L. Barabási et 
al., 2002 
 
 8 
Table 1. Properties and data from several real-world networks (continued) 
Network Size k γout γin lreal lpow Reference 
Metabolism 
E. coli 
778 7.4 2.2 2.2 3.2  
Oltvai et 
al., 2000 
Protein S. 
cerevisiae 
1870 2.39 2.4 2.4   
Jeong et al., 
2001 
Citation 
network 
783339 8.57  3   
Redner, 
1998 
Phone call 53*106 3.16 2.1 2.1   
Aiello et 
al., 2001 
Words, co-
occurrence 
460902 70.13 2.7 2.7   
Cancho & 
Solé, 2001 
Words, 
synonyms 
22311 13.48 2.8 2.8   
Yook et al., 
2001 
All network sizes (total vertices), the average degree (k), the power law exponents for both in 
and out degrees (𝛾),the real network average path length (𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) and the average path length for 
the power law degree distribution (𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑤) are provided. Note that most networks shown here have 
power law exponents between 2 and 3. 
2.3. Interdependence and cascading 
Most complex real-world networks do not function independently; instead they rely on 
information or resources from other networks. This phenomenon is common for several types of 
applications; for example, consider networks such as the communication network which is used 
for both voice and data by more than 90% of population (Poushter, 2016). Telecommunication 
networks today function correctly due to the electrical support of their operations from a 
functioning power grid. Similarly, power networks utilize communication networks for 
monitoring and control purposes (Hu, Yu, Cao, Ni, & Yu, 2014; Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 
2001). Researchers study these networks to keep them robust (Parandehgheibi & Modiano, 2013; 
Zhang & Tse, 2015), well-connected (Bairey & Stowell, 2014), and with increased accessibility 
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(Wheeler & O’Kelly, 1999). Then, there also exist networks in which researchers are interested 
in identifying key elements to decrease connectedness and reachability, as in the epidemic 
spreading problem in which diseases spread to different locations due to a moving population 
(Son, Bizhani, Christensen, Grassberger, & Paczuski, 2012; Wheeler & O’Kelly, 1999), or as in 
financial networks where the banking firms are interdependent entities that can be modeled to 
analyze the failure propagation in the economy (Huang, Vodenska, Havlin, & Stanley, 2013). 
Unlike simple, single, isolated network models which consist of simple, local node-to-node links 
called connectivity edges (intra-links), interdependent networks also have a set of links which 
serve to connect nodes from different networks to one another: these are called dependency links 
(inter-links). However, it is not necessary for every network to be dependent on every other 
network in an interdependent setting. Moreover, we have the general case in which dependency 
is asymmetric. As an example, power networks rely on a functioning transportation network for 
fuel and maintenance operations, whereas the transportation network, in general, does not require 
the power network to be operational (albeit electrical support does make it safer to use).  
The introduction and research of such models has revealed the importance of 
interdependency when studying robustness. When an interdependent network is considered as 
isolated or single network it leads to overestimation of network robustness (Huang, Shao, et al., 
2013). This is due to the fact that failures occurring in interdependent networks tend to cascade 
over the other networks using inter-links causing more failures (Bashan et al., 2013; Dong, Du, 
Tian, & Liu, 2015; Havlin et al., 2010). For this reason, a broader degree distribution in an 
isolated network protects it from random attacks and increases robustness (Yuan, Shao, Stanley, 
& Havlin, 2015); instead, in the case of interdependent networks higher degree renders it, 
potentially, more vulnerable. The well-connected hub nodes could be interdependent on a failed 
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node, which ultimately leads to their failures, and with them, the failure of a large fraction of 
nodes, which is, of course, a major concern (Gao, Buldyrev, Havlin, & Stanley, 2011). 
Furthermore, percolation in interdependent networks is significantly different than in single 
networks. In a single, isolated network the percolation transition is a second order continuous 
transition, whereas in interdependent networks percolation transition occurs when there is a 
discontinuity in the giant connected component due to cascading failures. Consider two networks 
which are interconnected where one of the network is subject to failure of 1 − 𝑝 fraction of 
nodes. If the failed number of nodes are lower than the critical threshold ie. 𝑝 > 𝑝𝑐, the size of 
giant connected component is finite 𝑃∞ > 0 and there remains a cluster of nodes connected to 
GCC and the cascading failures stop before whole network collapses. But if the fraction of failed 
nodes 1 − 𝑝 is higher than critical threshold ie. 𝑝 < 𝑝𝑐, then this leads complete failure of nodes 
in both networks. When 𝑝 decreases below 𝑝𝑐 from one, 𝑃∞ falls to zero instantly showing 
discontinuity as first order transition. This cascading of failures is also referred to as an 
avalanche (Bashan, Parshani, & Havlin, 2011; Baxter, Dorogovtsev, Goltsev, & Mendes, 2012; 
Dong et al., 2015; Dong, Tian, Du, Fu, & Stanley, 2014; Havlin, Stanley, Bashan, Gao, & 
Kenett, 2015; Leicht & D’Souza, 2009a). 
A simple pictorial example of percolation and cascading failures in interdependent 
networks is provided in Figure 1. Initially, a fraction of nodes 1 − 𝑝 is disabled from Network 1 
along with all their connections. This initial failure then propagates to the interdependent 
Network 2. All the nodes in Network 2 with dependency links to any failed nodes in Network 1 
will also fail as a result. Based on percolation theory all nodes separated from the giant 
connected component are now non-functional. This failure further cascades back to Network 1 
and its interdependent nodes, and this process goes on until either there is a mutual giant 
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connected component, or when the network is completed disconnected. Interdependent networks 
are, then, more vulnerable to random attacks and failure of even a small subset of nodes can 
cause large scale failure (Havlin et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 1. An example of percolation and cascading failures in interdependent networks.  
2.3.1. Interdependence of power and communication networks 
One of the most studied pairs of interdependent networks are the power distribution and 
the communication network (Parandehgheibi & Modiano, 2013; Parandehgheibi, Modiano, & 
Hay, 2014). This is mainly because of how intertwined these networks are on one another in their 
current state, as well as the importance of maintaining the robustness of these networks seeing as 
they affect multiple and diverse facets of human activities. A series of probabilistic, 
deterministic, and heuristic methods have been developed to identify the network vulnerabilities 
and the risk of cascading failures in the power grid. An excellent overview of some of those 
methods has been curated by Papic et al. (2011). Nowadays, due to several load and tripping 
control measures, the power grid is more robust (NERC, 2017). Yet, there exist scenarios where 
failures occurring in specific substations, transmission lines, or power stations could render both 
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the power distribution and the communication networks non-operational; as seen before the 
initial failure could also be on the communications side. It is indeed true that a common reason 
behind blackouts is often these types of cascading failures (Wei, Luo, & Zhang, 2012; Motter, 
2004), and, when such failures occur, it is both a very expensive and long process to restore 
everything back to their normal state. 
2.4.  Critical node problem 
The Critical Node Problem (CNP), introduced in (Borgatti, 2006) and (Arulselvan, 
Commander, Elefteriadou, & Pardalos, 2009), is described as an optimization problem of finding 
a set of k vertices, whose removal from the graph minimizes the pairwise connectivity (increased 
fragmentation) between nodes in the resulting subgraph. Another variation of CNP was later 
introduced in (Arulselvan, Commander, Shylo, & Pardalos, 2011), referred to as CC-CNP or 
Cardinality-Constrained Critical Node Detection Problem, with a different objective of finding 
the minimum set of vertices whose removal leads to a connectivity index below a specified limit. 
The CNP has many applications: as an example, in (Boginski & Commander, 2009) the authors 
use both CNP and CC-CNP to find a set of proteins which are responsible for the most important 
interactions in protein-protein interaction networks for drug design. In a different study by 
(Ventresca & Aleman, 2013) related to disease spread mitigation, critical nodes are considered as 
target nodes for vaccination to decrease the transmissibility of a disease.  
Extensions of the critical node problem, like the Critical Node and Critical Link 
Disruptor problems, are studied in (Yilin Shen et al., 2013); therein, a linear programming based 
𝑂 (
𝑛−𝑘
𝑛𝜀
)-approximation rounding algorithm is proposed to help identify critical nodes and edges. 
Like in our work, studies have also been performed on finding critical nodes in interdependent 
networks: for example, the work by (Seo, Mishra, Li, & Thai, 2015) introduces and studies the 
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Cascading Critical Node Problem (CasCN) and proposes an 𝑂(𝑛1−𝜖)-approximation algorithm. 
This work employs the Load Redistribution model and weighted flow distribution model 
proposed in (Wu, Peng, Wang, Chan, & Wong, 2008) to find a set of critical nodes by failing 
nodes iteratively. This effectively captures the direct impact of a node and the mutual impact of a 
set of failed nodes. Other variations of CNP include node and edge disruptor problems like 𝛽 
edge and vertex disruptor problem (Dinh, Xuan, Thai, Pardalos, & Znati, 2012) which admits an 
𝑂(log 𝑛 log log 𝑛) pseudo-approximation algorithm for node disruptor and an 𝑂(log1.5 𝑛)-
approximation algorithm for the edge disruptor. This algorithm finds the minimum cardinality 
set of elements in a directed graph to cause a prespecified quantified level of degradation in its 
pairwise connectivity metric. When a level of degradation 𝛽 is given where 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1, the 
network overall pairwise connectivity is decreased to 𝛽 (
𝑛
2
). 
Last, a few studies have proposed strategies to reduce the risk of cascading failures in 
interdependent networks when subjected to targeted and random attacks. In their work, (Tang, 
Jing, He, & Stanley, 2016) study the interdependent supply chain network robustness to targeted 
attacks. Two networks, namely the physical supply chain network and the cyber layer network, 
each with the same number of nodes have one to one interdependence. Nodes are then assigned 
maximum capacity and failed nodes propagate their load onto neighboring nodes, based on the 
proposed priority redistribution model.  Nodes are removed in ascending degree, descending 
degree, random single, random multiple order, and finally network robustness is measured in 
terms of a Comprehensive Effectiveness Index (CEI). In (Nguyen et al., 2013), the authors study 
the Interdependent Power Network Disruptor problem, a problem shown to be NP-Complete but 
that admits an approximation of (2 − 𝜀). The proposed algorithm, Iterative Interdependent 
Centrality uses weighted centrality from intra-links as well as inter-links providing the minimum 
 14 
cardinality set of critical nodes up to a given 𝑘 to decrease the initial LCC to the smallest 
possible size.  
2.5. Interdependent network coupling models 
In most studies that aim to quantify topological properties of or detect critical nodes in 
interdependent networks, coupling models to accurately model the interdependencies are used. 
This is based on several assumptions, and it needs to happen as a preprocessing step due to the 
lack of exact data on dependency links of real-world interdependent networks (Radicchi, 2015). 
As an example, whose paradigm we follow here, Nguyen, Shen, & Thai (2013) investigate 
coupling methods, such as the random positive and random negative degree correlation 
coupling, based on weighted permutations, reverse degree coupling, and same degree coupling. 
They then proceed to use the dependency links generated by the above coupling methods in 
order to determine the efficiency of their critical node detection algorithms. In their work, it is 
also assumed that the degree distributions for both intra- and inter- network connectivity follow a 
Poisson distribution (Leicht & D’Souza, 2009b). 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Power and communication network model 
Many real-world networks are shown to belong to a class of networks called scale-free 
networks. These networks possess a small number of nodes with very high connectivity (hubs) 
and a big number of nodes with low connectivity. The degree distribution of scale-free networks 
is based on a power law. In a scale-free network with exponential factor γ, the fraction of nodes 
with degree k is proportional to 𝑘−γ, that is P(k) ~ 𝑘−γ. In practice, the exponential factor for the 
communications network is observed to be between 2 and 2.6, while the exponential factor for 
power networks is observed to be between 2.5 and 4. Due to the lack of exact graph data for the 
both networks, a synthetic network is generated using an exponential factor that varies from 2.2 
to 3.0. 
One method of generating a scale-free network is by using the Barabasi-Albert generator 
model. The BA model uses preferential attachment to form edges in the network based on the 
provided exponential factor γ. The insight is to form a network having degree distribution that 
follows a power law with the chosen scaling exponent. 
3.2. Cascading failures model 
Considering two network graphs 𝐺𝑘 = (𝑉𝑘, 𝐸𝑘) and  𝐺𝑙 = (𝑉𝑙, 𝐸𝑙) where 𝑉𝑘 are the 
vertices of graph 𝑘 and 𝐸𝑘 are the edges of graph 𝑘, whereas 𝑉𝑙 are the vertices of graph 𝑙 and 𝐸𝑙 
are the edges of graph 𝑙, and 𝐸𝑘𝑙 = {(𝑢, 𝑣): 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉𝑘, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉𝑙 } represents the interdependency links 
between graphs 𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙. Any node 𝑢 𝑜𝑟 𝑣 is only functional when they are connected to the 
giant connected component of their respective graph i.e.. 𝐺𝑘 or 𝐺𝑙.  
The cascading failure model in this study (Havlin et al., 2010) has been used and 
evaluated in several studies before. Initially, a set of nodes in 𝐺𝑘 fail; nodes are then separated 
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from the Giant Connected Component of 𝐺𝑘 because of the failures are also impacted and are 
considered failed. This new failure from these nodes propagates to the connected nodes in the 
interdependent network and causes failure in these nodes of 𝐺𝑙 , which, in turn, are interdependent 
on failed nodes from 𝐺𝑘.  
In this study, we consider three cascading effect scenarios. We opted for three scenarios 
so as to gather more detailed information on the cascading effects occurring due to the presence 
of interdependency links. The three failure scenarios are described as follows: (a) in the first 
scenario, a node fails when all of its interconnected nodes fail; (b) in the second scenario, a node 
only fails when at least 50% or more of its interconnected nodes fail; and (c) in the third 
scenario, a node fails when at least one of its interconnected nodes fail. 
3.3. Iterative interdependent centrality 
Iterative Interdependent Centrality, proposed in (Nguyen et al., 2013) is an algorithm to 
find critical nodes in interdependent networks. Considering an interdependent system 
𝐽(𝐺𝑘, 𝐺𝑙 , 𝐸𝑘𝑙)  and 𝐸𝑘𝑙 = {(𝑢, 𝑣): 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉𝑘, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉𝑙 } , IIC works on the phenomenon that if 𝑢 is 
critical then its coupled node 𝑣 should be treated as critical, too, and the neighbors of 𝑢 should 
also play a key role in determining the criticality of 𝑢. For this reason, IIC aims to capture both 
intra- and inter- centrality. Intra-centrality, being one of the traditional centrality measures like 
degree, closeness etc., gives the importance of a node within the network; these intra centrality 
scores are then updated on to the coupled nodes in the interdependent network to obtain new 
weighted centrality scores. The centrality vector 𝑥𝑡 of IIC at 𝑡𝑡ℎ iteration is formed using  
𝑥𝑡 =
𝑀𝑢,𝑣
𝑘 𝑀𝑢,𝑣
𝑙 𝑥𝑡−2
𝐶𝑘𝐶𝑙
  where 𝑀𝑢,𝑣
𝑘 {
𝛼
1
𝑑𝑣
0
   
𝑖𝑓 𝑢 = 𝑣
𝑖𝑓 (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸𝑘
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 and  𝑀𝑢,𝑣
𝑙 {
𝛼
1
𝑑𝑣
0
   
𝑖𝑓 𝑢 = 𝑣
𝑖𝑓 (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸𝑙
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 
are two matrices formed using networks 𝐺𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐺𝑙, whereas 𝐶𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑙 and two constants used 
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for the convergence of the centrality vector. Our approach to finding critical nodes replaces the 
intra-centrality of IIC using a novel centrality algorithm explained below. 
3.4. Star degree and modified IIC 
Consider, like before, two interconnected networks 𝐺𝑘 and  𝐺𝑙 where (𝑉𝑘 , 𝐸𝑘) represent 
nodes and edges of network 𝑘, similarly (𝑉𝑙, 𝐸𝑙) for network 𝑙, also 𝐸𝑘𝑙 = {(𝑢, 𝑣): 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉𝑘, 𝑣 ∈
𝑉𝑙 } represents interdependency links between nodes of 𝑘 and 𝑙. The calculation of the star 
degree centrality score, introduced by (Vogiatzis & Camur, 2017), is done by analyzing three 
levels of failure for each selected node. At the first level of failure the selected node and all its 
adjacent nodes in other interdependent networks stop working. These nodes are categorized as 
“center” nodes. Then the failures cascade further to all the nodes that are connected to “center” 
nodes but also do not have any inter- or intra-connections between these nodes. These nodes are 
categorized as “failed” nodes. After that the failure cascades further to all nodes that are 
connected to “failed” nodes, with these nodes being categorized as “affected” nodes. The main 
objective of Star Degree is to maximize the cardinality of the “affected” nodes set. Let us define 
the following three decision variables: 
𝑥𝑖
(𝑘)
{
1
0
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑘 𝑖𝑠 "𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟"
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑦𝑖
(𝑘)
{
1
0
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑘 𝑖𝑠 "𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑"
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑧𝑖
(𝑘)
{
1
0
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑘 𝑖𝑠 "𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑"
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Moreover, let the following sets be defined as: 
𝑁𝑘(𝑖) ∶  𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑘 
𝑁𝑘[𝑖] ∶  𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑘 & 𝑖 
𝑁𝑘𝑙(𝑖) ∶  𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑉𝑙 
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𝑁𝑘𝑙[𝑖] ∶  𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑉𝑙 & 𝑖 
Then, the formulation can now be presented as:  
Maximize ∑ ∑ 𝑧𝑖
(𝑘)
𝑖∈𝑉𝑘𝑘
 
Subject to 
𝑧𝑖
(𝑘)
≤  ∑ 𝑦𝑗
(𝑘)
𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑗
(𝑙)
𝑗∈𝑁𝑘𝑙(𝑖)𝑙≠𝑘
         ∀𝑖, ∀𝑘 
𝑦𝑖
(𝑘) ≤ ∑ 𝑥𝑗
(𝑘)
𝑗𝜖𝑁[𝑖]
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑗
(𝑙)
𝑗∈𝑁𝑘𝑙(𝑖)𝑙≠𝑘
          ∀𝑖, ∀𝑘 
𝑦𝑖
(𝑘) + 𝑦𝑗
(𝑘)
≤ 1                                             ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐸𝑘, ∀𝑘 
𝑦𝑖
(𝑘) + 𝑦𝑗
(𝑙)
≤ 1                                              ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐸𝑘𝑙 , ∀𝑘, ∀𝑙 ≠ 𝑘 
𝑦𝑖
(𝑘) + 𝑧𝑖
(𝑘)
≤ 1                                             ∀  𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑘, ∀𝑘 
𝑥𝑖
(𝑘)
, 𝑦𝑖
(𝑘)
, 𝑧𝑖
(𝑘)
∈ {0,1}                                 ∀  𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑘, ∀𝑘 
𝑥𝑢
(𝑘) = 1 
𝑥𝑗
(𝑙) = 𝑥𝑖
(𝑘)                                                     ∀∈ 𝑉𝑙 ; (𝑢, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐸𝑘𝑙 , ∀𝑘, ∀𝑙 ≠ 𝑘  
Larger and more well-connected networks require a higher number of critical nodes 
before the network breaks down, and this can consume a significant amount of computational 
time. It is for that reason that a modified version of IIC embeds the process of cascading into 
each iteration. Initially a converged centrality vector is calculated using the characteristic matrix 
obtained from the considered power and communication networks. The critical node is extracted 
from this centrality vector and then disconnected from the power network. This process causes a 
cascade of failures in both networks through inter- and intra-links, based on the cascading failure 
model explained earlier. Only one connected component exists in both graphs at the end of the 
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cascading process implying that the failure cannot cascade any further because all the remaining 
nodes are connected to the largest connected component of their individual network and also 
have a functional interdependent node. Consider subgraphs of both power and communication 
network 𝐺𝑘
′ = (𝑉𝑘
′, 𝐸𝑘
′ ) and 𝐺𝑙
′ = (𝑉𝑙
′, 𝐸𝑙
′) where (𝑉𝑘
′, 𝐸𝑘
′ ) and (𝑉𝑙
′, 𝐸𝑙
′)  are the vertices and edges 
of 𝐿𝐶𝐶(𝐺𝑘) and 𝐿𝐶𝐶(𝐺𝑙) respectively. These subgraphs are then used to find the new 
characteristic matrix 𝑀𝑢,𝑣
𝑘′ 𝑀𝑢,𝑣
𝑙′  in the next iteration. The process continues until a number of k 
critical nodes are found or the specified total level of disruption is reached. The size of the 
characteristic matrix decreases as the numbed of failed nodes increases.  
3.5. Coupling models 
3.5.1. One to one model 
This coupling strategy uses the Random Positive Degree Correlation Coupling shown in 
(Nguyen et al., 2013). Two random weighted permutations are generated with nodes of graph 𝐺𝑘 
and 𝐺𝑙 as elements of set and having the length equal to total number of vertices 𝑛 in each graph. 
The degree of the node is considered as the weight for the permutation. In both the generated sets 
{𝑣1
𝑘′ , 𝑣2
𝑘′ , 𝑣3
𝑘′ , … 𝑣𝑛
𝑘′} and {𝑣1
𝑙′ , 𝑣2
𝑙′ , 𝑣3
𝑙′ , … 𝑣𝑛
𝑙′}, elements with higher degrees tend to have lower 
indices because of the considered weights. This results in positive degree correlation and 𝑣1
𝑘′  is 
coupled with 𝑣1
𝑙′, 𝑣2
𝑘′  with 𝑣2
𝑙′ ,…., 𝑣𝑛
𝑘′  with 𝑣𝑛
𝑙′ .  
3.5.2. One to multiple model 
In the one to multiple coupling strategy the primary rule is that one node of the power 
network is allowed to be coupled with several nodes in the communications network; however, a 
node in the communications network can only be coupled with a single node from the power 
network  𝐸𝑘𝑙 = {(𝑢, 𝑣): 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉𝑘, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉𝑙 }.  The distribution of interdependent links follows a long-
tailed distribution, like power law graphs. A small subset of nodes in 𝐺𝑘 have a high number of 
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interdependent links per node whereas a large subset of nodes has fewer or no interdependent 
links. Initially, a random weighted permutation is generated for nodes of the power network 
where the weight of the nodes is their intra-centrality. Using this random weighted set, each node 
is assigned a certain number of interdependent links and from this permuted set, nodes which 
have lower indices are assigned a higher number of interdependent links. Further explanations on 
how this model is used are provided in Section 4.2.2 of the Computational Results. 
3.5.3. Multiple to one model 
The multiple to one model is similar to the previous case; in this one, though, nodes of 
the communications network (𝐺𝑙) can have multiple interdependent links per node, but each node 
of the power network (𝐺𝑘) can only have one interdependent link. Similar to one to multiple, a 
random weighted permutation is generated with the intra-centrality score of the nodes in the 
communications network as the weights. Nodes from the communications network are assigned 
interdependent links based on their indices in the permuted set. The total interdependent links per 
node for overall network follows a long tail distribution. The exact working is explained further 
in Section 4.2.3. 
3.5.4. Multiple to multiple model 
Finally, the multiple to multiple model is the combination of the above models. Nodes are 
selected on the similar basis such that the number of interdependent links per node follow a long 
tail distribution for both networks. Each node can have any number of interdependent links. Two 
random weighted permutations are generated for both networks with intra centrality score of 
nodes as their weight and nodes based on their indices in the permuted set, they are assigned total 
number of interdependent links. The exact working is explained further in Section 4.2.4. 
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CHAPTER 4. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
In this section, we describe our experimental framework. We perform a series of 
experiments on two coupled (power and communications) networks, as described in Section 3.1. 
We compare the total breakdown of both networks for different values of 𝛾 ∈ {2.2, 2.6, 3.0} and 
for different metrics for both networks, considering the cascading effects discussed in Section 
3.2. More specifically, we compare the resulting Largest Connected Component (LCC) for Star 
Degree with Modified IIC (described in Section 3.4), Degree with the Original IIC (described in 
Section 3.3), Simple Star Degree (described in Section 3.4), Simple Degree, and Simple 
Betweenness centralities. We perform our experiments on a series of coupling models (see 
Section 3.5). Our results (per coupling model) follow in the remainder of this chapter. 
4.1. One to one coupling model 
The idea behind the one to one model is given in Section 3.5.1. This model is tested on 
synthetic scale free networks of sizes of a 150-nodes power network coupled with a 150-nodes 
communication network, 300-nodes power network coupled with 300-nodes communication 
network, 500-nodes power network coupled with 500-nodes communication network. The 
networks have degree distributions that follow the power law, and as the scaling exponent 
increases, the networks become denser having an increased number of intra-links. A total of 9 
experiments are conducted which contain all possible combination of pairs with 𝛾(2.2, 2.6, 3.0). 
The performance is evaluated across 5 independent runs and the average of the two outputs, 
namely the size of the LCC and the total number of critical nodes initially removed from the 
power network are used to construct the plots shown below in Figures 2-4. 
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Figure 2. One to One model, Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 3. One to One model, Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 4. One to One model, Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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4.2. Other models 
This subsection describes the experimental setup of the three other models used in this 
study. We first describe the different scenarios that arise for these models. 
4.2.1. Scenarios 
There are three main scenarios that arise in each of the models. In the first one, a node 
stops functioning either when all its interconnected nodes have failed or if the node has been 
disconnected from the largest connected component of its own network.  
In the second scenario, a node stops functioning either when half or more of its 
interconnected nodes have failed or if the node has been disconnected from the largest connected 
component of its own network. 
Last, in the final scenario under consideration, a node stops functioning when any of its 
interconnected nodes have failed or if the node has been disconnected from the largest connected 
component of its own network. We can now proceed to describe the remaining models. 
4.2.2. One to multiple coupling model 
For experimentation, a synthetic power and communications network are generated based 
on the selected combination of total number of nodes and scaling exponent 𝛾 for both networks. 
A weighted random permutation is generated {𝑑1
𝑘𝑙, 𝑑2
𝑘𝑙 , … , 𝑑𝑛
𝑘𝑙} with a total length equal to the 
number of nodes in the power network where 𝑑1
𝑘𝑙 is the the number of interdependent links for 
𝑣1
𝑘. The permuted set contains one of these elements {1,2,3,4} and their weights are selected to 
be {0.6,0.2,0.15,0.05}. This implies that a power network node can be connected to 1, 2, 3, or 4 
communications network nodes with probabilities 0.6, 0.2, 0.15, 0.05, respectively. Two more 
random weighted permutations are generated with vertices of the power and communications 
networks and now the degree of nodes are considered as weights {𝑣1
𝑘′ , 𝑣2
𝑘′ , 𝑣3
𝑘′ , … 𝑣𝑛
𝑘′} and 
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{𝑣1
𝑙′ , 𝑣2
𝑙′ , 𝑣3
𝑙′ , … 𝑣𝑛
𝑙′}. Both networks are coupled using the set {𝑑1
𝑘𝑙, 𝑑2
𝑘𝑙 , … , 𝑑𝑛
𝑘𝑙}, i.e. if 𝑑1
𝑘𝑙 is 3 
then 𝑣1
𝑘′  is coupled with {𝑣1
𝑙′, 𝑣2
𝑙′ , 𝑣3
𝑙′}.  Results are plotted based on an average of 5 runs with 
power and communications network pairs of 150 nodes, 300 nodes, and 500 nodes (as was the 
case for the first model) for all 3 scenarios and all possible combinations of 𝛾 from (2.2, 2.6. 
3.0). This results again in a total of 9 experiments for each scenario under the one to multiple 
coupling model. The results are presented in Figures 5-13. 
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Figure 5. One to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 6. One to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 7. One to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 8. One to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 9. One to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 10. One to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 11. One to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 12. One to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 13. One to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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4.2.3. Multiple to one coupling model 
The opposite model is also designed for experimentation. Now, a weighted random 
permutation is generated {𝑑1
𝑙𝑘, 𝑑2
𝑙𝑘, … , 𝑑𝑛
𝑙𝑘} with total length as the number of nodes in the 
communications network where 𝑑1
𝑙𝑘 is the the number of interdependent links for 𝑣1
𝑙  and 𝑑1
𝑙𝑘 is 
the the number of interdependent links for 𝑣1
𝑙 . Following the same setup as before, but starting 
the discussion from the communications network, we obtain the results again a total of 9 
experiments for each scenario under the multiple to one coupling model. The results of all three 
scenarios are shown in Figures 14-22.  
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Figure 14. Multiple to One model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 15. Multiple to One model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 16. Multiple to One model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 17. Multiple to One model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 18. Multiple to One model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 19. Multiple to One model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 20. Multiple to One model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 21. Multiple to One model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 22. Multiple to One model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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4.2.4. Multiple to multiple coupling model 
Last, we investigate a multiple to multiple coupling model. In this model, two weighted 
random permutations are generated {𝑑1
𝑘𝑙 , 𝑑2
𝑘𝑙, … , 𝑑𝑛
𝑘𝑙} and {𝑑1
𝑙𝑘, 𝑑2
𝑙𝑘, … , 𝑑𝑛
𝑙𝑘} with total length 
equal to the number of nodes in the power network and the communications network, 
respectively, where 𝑑1
𝑘𝑙 is the the number of interdependent links for 𝑣1
𝑘 and 𝑑1
𝑙𝑘 is the number of 
interdependent links for 𝑣1
𝑙 . The permuted sets contain one of these elements {1,2,3,4} and their 
weights are (as earlier) {0.6,0.2,0.15,0.05}. Two more random weighted permutations are 
generated with elements as vertices of power and communications network and the degree of the 
nodes in their network are considered as weights {𝑣1
𝑘′ , 𝑣2
𝑘′ , 𝑣3
𝑘′ , … 𝑣𝑛
𝑘′} and {𝑣1
𝑙′ , 𝑣2
𝑙′ , 𝑣3
𝑙′ , … 𝑣𝑛
𝑙′}, 
respectively. Both networks are coupled using the set {𝑑1
𝑘𝑙, 𝑑2
𝑘𝑙 , … , 𝑑𝑛
𝑘𝑙}, i.e. if 𝑑1
𝑘𝑙 is 3 then 𝑣1
𝑘′  is 
coupled with {𝑣1
𝑙′, 𝑣2
𝑙′ , 𝑣3
𝑙′}; similarly, if  𝑑1
𝑙𝑘 is 3 then 𝑣1
𝑙′  is coupled with {𝑣1
𝑘′, 𝑣2
𝑘′ , 𝑣3
𝑘′}.  Using 
the same setup as before for sizes and 𝛾 results in a total of 9 experiments per scenario under the 
multiple to multiple coupling model. The results are shown in Figures 23-31. 
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Figure 23. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 24. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 25. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 1 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 26. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 27. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 28. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 2 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 29. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 150-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 30. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 300-node networks across 5 runs 
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Figure 31. Multiple to Multiple model, Scenario 3 Average LCC vs Critical Nodes removed for 500-node networks across 5 runs 
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4.3. Analysis 
Let us begin with the one to one model. As we observe, simple star degree shows a 
superior performance to all other metrics compared, and finds the smallest number of critical 
nodes that lead to maximum network breakdown. This behavior is the same for densely and 
loosely connected networks. Simple betweenness performs similarly well in loosely connected 
networks (𝛾=2.2, 2.6); however, it fails to find a small set of critical nodes in densely connected 
networks. Star degree IIC is outperformed in loosely connected networks, but reaches maximum 
breakdown faster in densely connected networks, even in cases where convergence is slower 
than other metrics for the first few critical nodes. Degree IIC performs slower than simple star 
degree in all network configurations tested, while in dense configurations it surpasses other 
conventional metrics, and surpasses node degree in loosely connected networks. 
For the one to multiple model, simple star degree performs best and converges faster in 
all the tests conducted. Although simple betweenness shows good performance in loosely 
connected networks for all scenarios of this model, once the nodes are more densely connected 
the performance starts going down and the network stays connected even when a larger number 
of high betweenness nodes are disconnected from the power network. Simple node degree 
performance stays similar to betweenness but is more efficient in scenarios where the power 
network is densely connected. Degree with original IIC maintains its performance in loosely 
connected networks and combination of loosely connected power network with dense 
communication network. Star degree with modified IIC converges slower than other centrality 
scores in loosely connected power network. When it comes to densely connected power and 
communication network, though, the maximum network breakdown is achieved sooner with 
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some scenarios where it converges significantly faster than degree IIC, betweenness, or simple 
degree. These patterns are reflected in networks of all tested sizes. 
The results of multiple to one model reveal a similar pattern to the one to multiple model, 
where simple star degree shows a superior performance in all scenarios and star degree with 
modified IIC performs well in scenarios with a dense power network. Even though it converges 
slowly after the removal of the first few critical nodes, the maximum breakdown is reached faster 
than betweenness, simple degree, or degree IIC. Failure scenario 3 causes the most amount of 
disruption with the smallest number of critical nodes out of all 3 scenarios, due to its setup. 
Last, the results of multiple to multiple model show that in scenarios 1 and 2, the network 
is much less vulnerable since for a node to fail all or at least half of the interdependent nodes 
from other networks need to fail as well. In this scenario, both networks have multiple 
interdependent links keeping them well-connected and, hence, the cascading of failures is 
stopped sooner than all other coupling models. However, in scenario 3, this effect is completely 
the opposite as the failure propagates much further for every critical node failed. As we can 
observe in the Figures, it takes only 5 to 15 critical nodes for the whole network to completely 
break apart in scenario 3. As seen previously in other models, simple star degree performs better 
here, as well with degree IIC performing better than simple node degree and betweenness in 
dense networks. Star degree IIC performs better in densely connected power networks and 
converges faster than other models in these dense network configurations. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this work, we investigated the coupling of two networks (namely a power and a 
communications network) from a graph theoretic perspective. Our objective was to identify 
metrics that can help us predict the importance of a node and the overall breakdown of the 
network should it fail. We proposed three new coupling models, based on the literature, and 
extended the one to one coupling model that is typically used. We also proposed three failure 
scenarios for the different coupling models.  
More importantly though we developed a new modified IIC technique to identify critical 
nodes, as well as tried a new centrality metric (star centrality) in both its simple and its IIC 
versions. From our experimental setup, we were able to show that the newly proposed metrics 
are performing well in small and medium sized networks that are generated by a power law 
distribution.  
The star centrality metric is also defined for more than 2 coupled networks. It is hence 
one of our goals to investigate how well its performance is in the presence of multiple 
interdependent networks. This would also have applications in real life, as it is usually many 
infrastructures that are coupled (pipelines, transportation networks, power, communications, 
etc.). Another important aspect of our work has to do with the study of networks that are scale-
free: it would be interesting to investigate how the performance of the studied metrics is affected 
when different networks follow different distributions. Last, our cascading setup and metrics are 
computationally expensive, which makes them prohibitive to use in very large-scale networks. It 
is for that reason that we would like to propose new heuristic techniques to identify critical nodes 
in such intertwined networks.  
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